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INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE, CIVIC VIRTUE AND DIALOGUE: A REPUBLICAN 
BALANCING ACT FOR THE EU CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 
Desmond Johnson* 
 
Abstract: Non-domination is a central tenet of republicanism and a foundational principle of 
the EU constitutional order. Republicanism, however, has often been overlooked as a 
legitimating principle in the EU. This article explores the EU from a non-dominating 
paradigm. It shows that the institutional balance, as opposed to the separation of powers, has 
descriptive and normative force in the EU. Additionally, this analysis provides a systematic 
reinterpretation of the EU analysing its institutional balance from a dialogical perspective that 
emphasizes republican values linked with civic virtue. This highlights that intergovernmental, 
supranational, the peoples, interest group, and technocratic actors are vital players ‘free and 
equal’ to exert influence that shapes and reshapes the institutional balance to reflect their own 
vision of the public good. The republican model presented in this article provides for the 
active participation and limitation of each actor that can – and should – be understood as 
enhancing the democratic nature and legitimation of the EU. 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since the inception of the European integration process, the framers of the Treaties have 
envisaged a multilevel governance mechanism to prevent any societal force from dominating 
the European continent.1 In this context, it is important to emphasize that ‘the EU was born 
first and foremost as an anti-hegemonic project’ to balance competing societal forces within 
Europe.2 The initial Treaties understood that an essential element of the public good in 
Europe was to guarantee peace and security across the continent.3 Accordingly, in the 
aftermath of World War II, the framers envisioned a non-dominating paradigm designed with 
the aim of preventing any societal force from unilaterally controlling Europe. This aim 
necessitates constitutional and institutional structures and processes that counterbalance 
competing societal forces. This central objective of establishing a continuous equilibrium that 
counterbalances societal forces leads to important debates on the legitimation of the EU 
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1 R Schuman, ‘Declaration of 9 May 1950: The Schuman Plan for European Integration’ in D Karmis and W 
Norman (eds), Theories of Federalism: A Reader (Palgrave Macmillan 2005) 203-205.   
2 S Bunse and K Aude Nicolaïdis, ‘Large Versus Small States: Anti-hegemony and the Politics of Shared 
Leadership in the EU’ in A Menon and S Weatherill (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the European Union (OUP 
2012) 249-266. 
3 This aim of peace and security continues to be of fundamental importance in the EU.  Consolidated Version of 
the Treaty on European Union [2012] OJ L 326/13 (TEU), Article 3. 
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constitutional order. For this reason, the EU is on an ongoing quest to achieve the republican 
ideal of balanced governance through non-domination. This contribution examines whether 
the EU constitutional order adheres to fundamental themes of republicanism.  
This article contends that a reinterpretation of EU governance from a republican 
perspective can help address fundamental challenges facing the EU. It provides a systematic 
reassessment of the EU constitutional order by analysing its institutional balance from a 
dialogical perspective, which itself emphasizes republican values. A further development of a 
republican model can address current challenges and in the process, enhance the legitimation 
of the EU.  
This constitutional model aims to promote central tenets of republicanism – non-
domination, non-arbitrariness, pluralism, dialogue, and the pursuit of the public good.4 A 
constitutional order, which promotes republicanism in the EU, can secure an institutional 
balance that reconciles a plurality of competing societal interests, legitimacy claims, and 
constitutional norms.5 Ultimately, such a framework can promote individual and political 
self-determination while achieving the public good. Despite the aspiration towards non-
domination at the initial stages of European integration, republicanism has too often been 
overlooked as a legitimating principle within the EU.6  Consequently, the central question of 
this article is whether a republican model of EU governance can add value to our 
understanding of the evolution of the institutional balance in the EU constitutional order. 
To explore the central question, the article proceeds with the following structure. 
First, the analysis shows that non-domination is an essential element of EU governance, 
highlighting the need to examine the potential of a republican model of the EU. Second, the 
article explores the relationship between the institutional balance and the separation of 
powers. It clarifies the distinction between the two constitutional approaches, before 
elucidating why the institutional balance is better suited for the EU. Third, it explores the 
concept of civic republicanism, connecting it with the ‘good life’ of the individual and the 
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community. This section constructs a constitutional model that links civic republicanism, 
institutional balance, and constitutional dialogue.7 Fourth, a republican perspective is utilized 
to explain how the EU constitutional order has evolved to incorporate different dimensions of 
governance – intergovernmental, supranational, the peoples of Europe, interest groups, and 
technocratic. The analysis concludes that the EU has significantly increased the number of 
formal and informal societal forces that operate in each of the dimensions of EU governance. 
This is consistent with the non-dominating and pluralistic aims of republicanism. Overall, this 
study traces the evolution of the institutional balance in the EU to demonstrate how its 
constitutional order is moving closer towards realizing republican ideals. It shows that a 
reinterpretation of EU governance through a republican model of institutional balance as 
constitutional dialogue contributes to debates concerning how to restructure and enhance the 
legitimation of the EU. Still, more steps must be taken to fully achieve republican aims, 
demonstrating that an intensification of republicanism in the EU can increase the legitimation 
of the Union while putting forth a framework to address current challenges. 
 
B. NON-DOMINATION AS AN ENDURING TENET OF EU GOVERNANCE 
A central organizing principle within the EU is non-domination. Non-dominating ideals 
embodied in the original European Framework were vividly illustrated with the purpose of 
pooling the resources of France and Germany in the area of coal and steel.8 This non-
dominating objective is exemplified in the Schuman Declaration that set out to tie the 
economies of the two economic powers and ensure the supply of coal and steel to both 
markets – as well as other member states - so that no single actor could control the distinct 
processes of war in Europe.9 Ultimately, to achieve the European public good of securing 
peace and security, the Schuman Declaration was designed to constrain all societal forces and 
guarantee balanced Franco-German relations. A comprehensive system of checks and 
balances operating at different levels of governance was necessary to realize such objectives.  
This shift from ‘pure’ power dynamics, which dominated European relations before 
the two devastating World Wars, to a European system focused on cooperation and 
guaranteed by the checks and balances established in the Treaties is a great milestone in 
European integration.10 The original European framework shows that non-domination is an 
                                                
7 The ‘good life’ is explained in more detail in section C. 
8 For a comprehensive analysis of the early developments in EU integration, see G Bebr, ‘The European Coal 
and Steel Community; A Political and Legal Innovation’ (1953) 63(1) The Yale Law Journal 1.  
9 Schuman (n 1) 203-04. 
10 Bunse and Aude Nicolaïdis (n 2) 249-253.  
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essential founding principle at the heart of the European project, signifying that a republican 
model was being used to reassess, strengthen, and restructure the European order. 
Importantly, this enduring aspiration to ensure societal forces are balanced and prevent any 
element from obtaining a dominant position is as vital today as it was during the initial stages 
of European integration.11  
The EU is in a state of crisis.12 This present state of volatility is exemplified across 
sectors, from Brexit to security, the euro, and European migration. Significant questions arise 
concerning whether the EU and its constitutional order have the capacity to handle such 
challenges simultaneously.13 Such transformative events have led to increasing demands on 
government at different levels – the local, national, transnational, and international. 
Consequently, greater emphasis is placed on the enduring constitutional question within 
Europe: what type of governmental system is (or should exist in) the EU? These 
developments trigger renewed interest in the intricate workings of the EU constitutional 
order.  
 The EU receives intense criticism for what detractors label a drastically inadequate 
response to these crises.14 One of the most fundamental criticisms of the EU’s response to 
current challenges is the widespread perception that a significant ‘democratic deficit’ and 
‘accountability deficit’ still exist.15 Essentially, this perspective claims that EU decisions 
reflect the will of political elites rather than the peoples of Europe. Political elites are then 
able to shape EU governance at a great distance from EU citizens. Consequently, the EU 
currently suffers from the perception that technocrats dominate EU governance. 16 
Additionally, the complex constitutional structures and processes comprising EU governance 
make it increasingly difficult to hold the different actors who engage in EU decision-making 
to account.17 This perceived unresponsiveness to the desires of the peoples of Europe 
                                                
11 F Snyder, ‘The effectiveness of European Community law: Institutions, processes, tools and techniques’ 
(1993) 56(1) The Modern Law Review 19, 24.  
12 K Archick, ‘The European Union: Current Challenges and Future Prospects’ (2016) Congressional Research 
Service Report 44249. 
13 ibid. 
14 For further analysis of the different European crisis, see C Kapartziani and K Papapthanasiou, ‘The Refugee 
Crisis as a European Democratic Crisis’ (2016) 2 Glocalism: Journal of Culture, Politics and Innovation 1-4. 
15 ibid; M Avbelj, ‘Integral pre-emption of EU Democracy in Economic Crisis under Transnational Law’ (2015) 
4 Cambridge Journal of International & Comparative Law 242-267. 
16 M Dawson and F de Witte, ‘Constitutional Balance in the EU after the Euro‐Crisis’ (2013) 76(5) The Modern 
Law Review 817, 821. 
17 For a discussion concerning the complexity of judicial review in the context of EU legislation, see J Öberg, 
‘The rise of the Procedural Paradigm: Judicial Review of EU Legislation in Vertical Competence Disputes’ 
(2017) 13(2) Constitutional Law Review 248, 253-59. 
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highlights the lack of active participation in EU governance.18 Such challenges present vital 
questions concerning the legitimation of the EU constitutional order. 
The question remains whether the EU can realize republican aims. Can increased 
emphasis on republicanism enhance the legitimation of the EU’s responses to current 
challenges? This question demands a reassessment of the constitutional and institutional 
structures, norms, and processes within the EU. Accordingly, the next section examines the 
relationship between the institutional balance and the separation of powers. Such an 
examination is necessary to determine which mode of governance the EU utilizes to achieve 
its non-dominating aspirations. 
 
C. COMPETING MODES: INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE AND SEPARATION 
OF POWERS 
Ongoing contestation over the constitutional disposition of authority has been an enduring 
theme since the beginning of European integration.19 Debates over the legal and political 
nature of the EU highlight competing perspectives concerning how public power is or ought 
to be balanced in the EU.20 Such debates often concentrate on two distinct constitutional 
modes of governance: institutional balance and separation of powers.21 Despite the attention 
paid to each concept, as Majone and Chamon have argued, the precise relationship between 
the two modes of governance is still drastically understudied in EU discourse.22 This is 
surprising given that an increased emphasis on the relationship between these concepts can 
provide valuable insights into ‘the elusive constitutional nature’ of the EU.23 Thus, it is 
necessary to explore how the concepts relate to one another.  
                                                
18 B Crum, ‘Saving the Euro at the Cost of Democracy?’ (2013) 51(4) Journal of Common Market Studies 614, 
616-19. 
19 For detailed analysis of institutional debates concerning EU integration, see R Bieber, ‘Settlement of 
institutional conflicts on the basis of article 4 of the EEC Treaty’ (1984) 21(3) Common Market Law Review 
505-523; G Garrett and G Tsebelis, ‘An institutional critique of intergovernmentalism’ (1996) 
50(2) International Organization 269-299. 
20 G de Búrca, ‘The Institutional Development of the EU: A Constitutional Analysis’ in P Craig and G de Búrca 
(eds), The Evolution of EU Law (OUP 1999) 55-81. 
21 For an in depth analysis of the debates concerning the institutional balance and the existence (or lack thereof) 
of the separation of powers in the EU, see P Craig, ‘Institutions, Powers, and Institutional Balance’ in P Craig 
and G de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (OUP 2011) 41-84; G Conway, ‘Recovering a Separation of 
Powers in the European Union’ (2011) 17(3) European Law Journal 304-322. 
22 Both Majone and Chamon demonstrate that further research on the relationship between the institutional 
balance and separation of powers in the EU is necessary. G Majone, ‘Europe’s “Democratic Deficit”: The 
Question of Standards’ (1998) 4(1) European Law Journal 5-28; M Chamon, ‘The Institutional Balance, and Ill-
Fated Principle of EU Law?’ (2015) 21 European Public Law 371, 372. 
23 ibid.    
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Some similarities exist between the institutional balance and the separation of powers. 
Analogous to other modes of governance in constitutionalism, both attempt to limit 
government, control the exercise of public authority, and prevent the concentration of power 
in any single societal force. Each mode aims to diminish the potential for the arbitrary 
interference of individual and political self-determination by dispersing public authority and 
influence.24 This ‘objective of power-sharing’, demanding the dispersion of public power 
among different societal forces to prevent the arbitrary interference of individual and political 
self-determination, is an essential element of both concepts. Although the two modes of 
governance share this similar underlying rationale, it is a mistake to conflate them. The 
methods of dispersing and controlling public power differ as each utilizes different structures, 
processes, and decision-making arrangements to achieve constitutional objectives.  
The two modes of constitutional governance are competing, if not diametrically 
opposed. Accordingly, a significant question in EU governance is whether the institutional 
balance or the separation of powers adequately describes the EU.25 Others seek to ask the 
more normative question, whether either mode can offer a viable model to structure and 
articulate the disposition of power in the EU.26 This article argues that the institutional 
balance – as opposed to the tripartite separation of powers – should be utilized as a frame of 
reference and guiding constitutional norm for EU governance. Therefore, it is necessary to 
distinguish the concepts and explain why institutional balance better reflects the complex 
realities of the EU and is a normative aim to which the EU should aspire. The next section 
begins by elucidating the central tenets of the separation of powers theory to distinguish it 
from the institutional balance.  
1. The conventional, function-oriented separation of powers theory  
The traditional tripartite separation of powers theory espoused by the likes of Montesquieu 
and Madison reflects the constitutional maxim that the legislature legislates, the executive 
executes, and the judiciary adjudicates.27 This conventional function-oriented understanding 
derives from what Vile famously formulated as the ‘pure’ theory of separation of powers.28 
                                                
24 Unlike Chamon this work does not argue that institutional balance and the separation of powers have different 
overall aims, see Chamon (n 22) 373.  
25 JP Jacqué, ‘Principle of Institutional Balance’ (2004) 41 The Common Market Law Review 383-391; Majone 
(n 6) 319-339. 
26 Craig (n 21) 41-42.   
27 For an in depth examination of the separation of powers, see MJC Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation 
of Powers (2nd edn, Liberty Fund 1998); NW Barber, ‘Prelude to the Separation of powers’ (2001) 60(1) 
Cambridge Law Journal 59-88; E Carolon, The New Separation of Powers: A Theory for the Modern State 
(OUP 2009). 
28 Vile (n 27) 14-19.  
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The pure theory rests on three elements.29 First, it requires the division of government 
into three organs to ensure individual liberty: legislative, executive, and judiciary. Secondly, 
each organ exercises only one corresponding identifiable and distinct function of government. 
Each of the different organs is limited to exercising its ‘own’ specific function, preventing 
each from entering the territory of another. Thirdly, an individual may only be a member of 
one organ at any given time. Thus, the different organs and functions are kept separate and 
distinct. This pure approach, however, has never been applied in reality for any considerable 
time.30 The conventional function-oriented theory, nevertheless, reflects the core premise of 
the ‘pure’ theory that each of the distinct functions of government is the domain of a 
particular actor.  
2. The applicability of the separation of powers to the EU 
EU scholarship traditionally eschews the separation of powers theory. The institutional 
balance, as opposed to the separation of powers, is often used as the frame and guiding 
constitutional principle.31 This, however, has not stopped a few commentators from using the 
separation of powers theory to address constitutional questions.32 
 A prominent proponent of applying the separation of powers is Gerald Conway. For 
Conway, the tripartite separation of powers theory offers unique insights into constitutional 
challenges facing the EU and serves as a model to accurately describe the EU.33  Conway 
also justifies the use of the separation of powers from a normative angle proclaiming that the 
notion can safeguard democracy and the rule of law in the Union, while diminishing the 
democratic deficit.34 Similarly, Lenaerts declares that a functional understanding of the 
separation of powers theory can be used to describe the Union legal order and decrease the 
democratic deficit in the EU constitutional order.35 Thus, Conway and Lenaerts argue that a 
functional understanding of the separation of powers is applicable for the EU. 
However caution must be used when attempting to apply the separation of powers to 
the complex constitutional realities in the EU. Curtin argues that one of the most significant 
challenges for scholars and practitioners within the EU is to construct ‘a new model of 
                                                
29 ibid.  
30 Carolon (n 27) 18-22. 
31 Case 9-56, Meroni v High Authority EU:C:1958:7, [1958] ECR 00011; Case C-70/88, Parliament v Council 
(Chernobyl) EU:C:1991:373, [1990] ECR I-04529. 
32 Chamon acknowledges the fallacies with utilizing separation of powers to describe EU governance, but does 
ponder whether the separation of powers approach has normative appeal for the EU. See Chamon (n 22) 372. 
33 Conway (n 21) 304-322. 
34 ibid. 
35 K Lenaerts, ‘Some Reflections on the Separation of Powers in the European Community’ (1991) 28(1) 
Common Market Law Review 12-19. 
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separation of powers in the context of the EU political and legal systems’.36 Developing a 
new model of the tripartite theory is an arduous task and one that the author does not propose 
to undertake. For any constitutional model to have legitimating force, it must reflect the 
constitutional realities of that system of governance and achieve normative aims linked with 
the public good.37 When applied to the EU, the separation of powers does not fit this 
fundamental constitutional requirement.   
The current EU constitutional apparatus is inconsistent with the original vision of the 
separation of powers theory. Even the modified versions of the separation of powers that 
permits some blending and some form of checks and balances, including the ability for actors 
to exercise overlapping functions is inadequate according to the realites of EU governance.38 
Further, any ‘new’ model of the separation of powers theory must move so far away from the 
classical tripartite theory to reflect the complex realities of the EU that it would no longer 
retain the essential characteristics of the theory.39 In essence, it would only be a nominal 
separation of powers. For this reason, even with a significant overhaul, the theory of the 
separation of powers is ill-suited for a pluralistic and multilevel system as complex as EU 
governance. 
3. Distinguishing between separation of powers and institutional balance 
Fundamental differences exist between the separation of powers and the institutional balance 
theories. The separation of powers places normative force behind an actor obtaining a 
dominant position in the exercise of a particular power. The conventional understanding of 
the separation of powers theory rests on a hierarchical model of decision-making where a 
central organ of the state has the ultimate authority to take a ‘final’ decision in a particular 
exercise of power. Thus, only one central organ is vested with the ultimate authority in the 
different phases of governance – creating, applying, or interpreting.40 Under this theory, the 
legislature ‘dominates’ the lawmaking process; the executive ‘dominates’ the execution of 
                                                
36 D Curtin, ‘EU constitution as architecture: separation of powers in the twenty-first century’ in De Regels en 
Het Spel: Opstellen Over Recht, Filosofie, Literatuur en Geschiedenis Aangeboden aan Tom Eijsbouts (T.M.C. 
Asser Press 2011) 123-133. 
37 ibid. 
38 Such modified versions of the separation of powers would still permit one societal force to dominate the 
exercise of a particular public power. This is clarified in the following section. 
39 For instance, Ziller utilizes the separation of powers terminology but devises a new model in which to 
understand the distribution of powers within the Union,  thus making a significant departure from the 
conventional tripartite separation of powers model to a new approach. See J Ziller, ‘Separation of Powers in the 
European Union’s Intertwined System of Government: A Treaty Based Analysis for the Use of Political 
Scientists and Constitutional Lawyers’ (2008) 3 Il Politico 133-179. 
40 Barber (n 27) 59.  
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those laws during the implementation process; the court ‘dominates’ the interpretation of 
those laws in the judicial process.  
This conventional understanding of the separation of powers theory demands a fixed 
structure of institutional interaction between three centralized organs. Each of the structures 
of government is inherently linked with a particular function (function-oriented). The 
creation, application, and interpretation of constitutional norms, which shape and influence 
the meaning and interpretation of the Treaty, is not the exclusive domain of any single 
societal force. An understanding of EU governance where a single actor unilaterally 
establishes the constitutional rules of the game belies the complex constitutional realities in 
the EU. Thus, the separation of powers is overly simplified and vastly ill-equipped to capture 
the complexities of EU governance.  
The institutional balance, on the other hand, is a republican model of governance 
designed to achieve a balance between each of the competing societal forces within a 
constitutional order. 41 It demands that multiple actors share authority in the exercise of the 
different powers of governance,42 and a plurality of societal forces participate in each of the 
different processes of constitutional decision-making. Lenaerts exemplifies the dynamic 
multi-actor processes of EU governance stating that it seems impossible to characterize any 
Union institutions as the exclusive legislative or executive authority ‘since a close analysis of 
their prerogatives certainly does not indicate a clear-cut line between the legislative and the 
executive branches’.43   
The institutional balance, demands multi-actor and interactive processes of 
governance with the aim of preventing any single actor from unilaterally establishing, 
applying, or interpreting the Treaties. Thus, institutional balance is designed to eradicate the 
possibility of any societal force obtaining a dominant position. This mutual interdependence 
indicates that the institutional balance, unlike the separation of powers, attempts to prevent 
any societal force from unilaterally controlling the exercise of a particular power. The 
republican model of institutional balance as dialogue described in section D moves away 
from a hierarchical understanding of government towards a broader and more inclusive 
understanding of the exercise of public power. This not only more accurately reflects EU 
                                                
41 Craig (n 21) 41-42. 
42 R Dehousse, ‘Delegation of powers in the European union: The need for a multi-principals model’ (2008) 
31(4) West European Politics 789-805.  
43 Lenaerts (n 35) 13.  
Institutional Balance, Civic Virtue and Dialogue: A Republican Balancing Act for the EU 
Constitutional Order 
20 
governance, but also has normative legitimating force under a republican reading of EU 
governance.  
The overwhelming majority of scholarship agrees with the legitimation nature of the 
institutional balance. Jacqué and de Búrca contend that the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) utilizes institutional balance as a substitute or replacement for the separation 
of powers in the EU.44 Lenaerts and Verhoeven argue that ‘the Union’s institutional balance 
does not rest on an organic separation of powers but on a balanced interaction between 
representatives of various interests’.45 Prechal declares ‘it is no novelty to observe that the 
classical, often organic – understanding of the separation of powers makes little sense in the 
Community context’.46 Robert Schutze contends ‘the European Union – born in 1958 with 
the genetic code of an international organization – could hardly be viewed to reproduce the 
trias politca of a nation state’.47 Dashwood exemplifies the tensions with utilizing the 
separation of powers theory to explain the constitutional disposition of powers in the EU, 
elucidating that the EU does not have an identifiable legislator or executive but a multi-actor 
legislative and executive process.48  
The lawmaking process includes the Commission, Council, European Parliament 
(EP), national parliaments, and national governments. Executive and regulatory processes 
include the Commission, Council, EU agencies, comitology committees, ombudspersons, and 
a network of actors at the national level including national governments, agencies, and 
regulatory actors responsible for implementing EU policies.49 The judicial process includes 
interactions between the CJEU, the Commission, and national courts, which range from 
openly combative to extremely cooperative.50 Evidently, applying the separation of powers to 
clarify the disposition of authority between societal forces does not address the onerous tasks 
                                                
44 Jacqué (n 25) 383.  
45 K Lenaerts and A Verhoeven, ‘Institutional balance as a guarantee for democracy in EU governance’ in C 
Joerges and R Dehousse (eds), Good Governance in Europe’s Integrated Market (OUP 2002) 35-88; S 
Smismans, ‘Institutional Balance as Interest Representation: Some Reflections on Lenaerts and Verhoeven’ in C 
Joerges and R Dehousse (eds) 89-108. 
46 S Prechal, ‘Institutional Balance: A Fragile Principle with Uncertain Contents’ in T Heukels, N Blokker and 
M Brus (eds), The European Union After Amsterdam: A Legal Analysis (Kluwer Law International 1998) 273-
294. 
47 R Schütze, ‘Sharpening the Separation of Powers through a Hierarchy of Norms? Reflections on the Draft 
Constitutional Treaty’s regime for Legislative and Executive law-making’ (2005) European Institute of Public 
Administration Working Paper 2005/W/01, 5-17 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=996005> accessed 14 January 2018. 
48 A Dashwood, ‘The Limits of European Community Powers’ (1996) 21 European Law Review 113-128. 
49 ibid.  
50 M Claes and M De Visser, ‘Are you networked yet? On dialogues in European judicial networks’ (2012) 8 
Utrecht Law Review 100-114. 
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of how precisely to delineate who should exercise the distinct legislative, executive, and 
judicial powers in the EU.51 
There are currently a number of actors beyond those in the institutional triangle – the 
Commission, the EP, and the Council – that are essential to EU governance. De Búrca, for 
instance, recognizes a plethora of actors that exercise real public power in the EU.52 Curtin 
also highlights the increasing challenges with establishing a constitutional model that reflects 
the increasing confusion concerning the roles, powers, and relations between different actors 
within the EU constitutional apparatus.53 Importantly, Smismans agrees, arguing for a 
broader understanding of institutional balance to capture the wide degree of ‘functional’ 
interests that participate in EU governance.54 
Since a characteristic feature of the EU’s constitutional order is ‘the impossibility of 
mapping functions onto specific institutions’, the argument that the traditional separation of 
powers theory does not reflect EU governance is axiomatic.55 As Vile explains, the balancing 
of competing societal forces is no longer limited to balancing different elements within 
governments, but also counterbalancing societal forces including individuals, political parties, 
interests groups, businesses, and other actors within civil society.56 Thus, it is necessary to 
capture the multitude of different societal elements operating at different levels of governance 
that exercise public power in the EU.57  
This interdependency reflects the republican notion of institutional balance where a 
plurality of societal forces engages in multi-actor and interactive processes to exercise each 
public power. EU governance demands that multiple actors representing competing societal 
forces and legitimacy claims participate in each of the phases of decision-making. In the 
process, societal forces engage and deliberate over the meaning and application of the 
                                                
51  The next section illustrates how the separation of powers terminology has tremendous difficulty in 
distinguishing between legislative and executive functions.  
52 However, the literature often fails to recognize this ‘confusion’ increasingly occurs at the national level as 
well. 
53 Curtin explains the decentralization and fragmentation of EU power. See D Curtin, ‘Constitutional Structure 
of the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces’ (1993) 30 The Common Market Law Review 17-69. 
54 Smismans (n 46).  
55 ‘It is hardly necessary to remind the reader that the constitutional architecture of the Community is not based 
on the principle of separation of powers’: see J Hammitt et al (eds), The reality of precaution: Comparing Risk 
Regulation in the United States and Europe (RFF Press 2011) 415. 
56 Vile (n 27) 317.  
57 M Farrell, ‘EU External Relations: Exporting the EU Model of Governance?’ (2005) 10 European Foreign 
Affairs Review 451-462. 
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Founding Treaties.58 In the EU, one is hard pressed to find a definitive answer to the question 
as to who has the ultimate authority to exercise any of the distinct exercises of public power. 
Instead of a clear hierarchy, multiple actors are engaging in ongoing contestation concerning 
who has the authority to exercise public power in each of the distinct processes of EU 
governance.   
This analysis demonstrates that the institutional balance reflects the complex 
constitutional realities and the non-dominating ideals found in the EU better than the 
separation of powers. The institutional balance, contrary to the separation of powers, captures 
the continuous multi-actor, mutual interdependence and interactive processes in the EU. 
Thus, ongoing interaction between competing societal forces is vital in the constitutional 
arrangements of the EU, not the complete separation of actors along essentialist or 
functionalist lines. Under the institutional balance, there is no direct link between a particular 
actor and the exercise of a particular function. For these reasons, this study concurs with the 
majority of scholarship that acknowledges the two modes of governance are distinct, and that 
the institutional balance has more descriptive and normative force to explain the complex 
realities of EU governance.59 The next section utilizes the republican model of institutional 
balance as constitutional dialogue to incorporate the plurality of societal forces that 
participate in the different dimensions of EU governance.60  
 
D. CIVIC REPUBLICANISM, INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE, AND DIALOGUE 
Constitutional thought has focused on two distinct strands of political theory – liberalism and 
republicanism – to address questions concerning the legitimation of a governmental system. 
Republicanism demands that those who exercise public power must do so on behalf of the 
public good, instead of pursuing only their own factional self-interests.61 Liberalism focuses 
on the enduring pursuit of individual self-interests to the greatest extent possible.62 Therefore, 
the liberal perspective transforms the pursuit of public interests into a quest for obtaining 
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individual preferences.63 This article focuses on republicanism as opposed to liberalism. 
During this period of significant turmoil in Europe, republicanism is a constitutional model 
that can enhance the legitimation of the EU and therefore deserves greater attention.  
Republican thought is an essential strand of constitutionalism designed to achieve 
balance within a constitutional order.64 Republicanism has had a long and complex history, 
dating back to antiquity.65 It can be traced back to ancient Greek and Roman, where thinkers 
such as Plato, Aristotle, and Polybius included republican concepts, such as civic virtue and 
mixed government, as essential elements of ‘good’ government. In Republican Rome, it was 
Cicero who made a lasting imprint, while in the Florentine Renaissance period Machiavelli 
pioneered a republican movement.66 More recently, in the British and American context, the 
likes of Harrington and Madison inspired a wave of innovative developments within 
republicanism.67 In contemporary discourse, the work of Skinner, Pocock, and Pettit, has 
brought renewed interest to republican thought as a model to enhance the legitimation of 
contemporary constitutional orders.68  
The central tenets of republicanism include non-domination, non-arbitrariness, 
pluralism, and the pursuit of the public good.69 In addition, civic republicanism is one strand 
of constitutional thought that emphasizes the relations between individual and political self-
determination, active civic participation, and civic virtue.70 Thus, civic republicanism goes 
beyond the institutions of government and demands all forces within civil society play a role 
in the political process. Plato and Aristotle are emblematic of the republican ideal that in any 
‘good’ polity both the individual and the community are virtuous and just. This necessitates a 
constitutional order that promotes republican ideals linked to the limited government, self-
government, mixed constitutionalism, dialogue, civic virtue, and a system of balancing 
powers. 
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1. Concord trust civic republicanism 
Civic republicanism emphasizes that active civic participation in the political process is an 
essential element of the ‘good life’.71 It focuses on the interplay between the individual and 
the community, providing the framework for both to develop the republican ideal of civic 
virtue.72 Civic virtue rests on the notion that societal forces work on behalf of the community, 
instead of factional self-interests, to achieve the public good. 73  Civic republicanism 
understands that each societal force is responsible for the society they operate in and 
therefore must promote the good life for both the individual and the community. 
Consequently, each societal element shall actively engage in the political life to ensure a 
‘good’ or virtuous individual and community.74 Ideally, civic participation facilitates self-
government by promoting a deliberative environment that encourages a plurality of societal 
interests to engage and learn how to perfect the ‘art of governing’.75 Civic engagement 
ultimately leads to each societal force being ‘free and equal’ to articulate and assess what the 
public good is – or should be – and how best to achieve it within a constitutional order.  
Civic republicanism understands that citizens are constantly at the forefront of 
shaping and reshaping what the public good is and how constitutional values are modified to 
achieve republican aims in an ongoing public dialogue.76 This public dialogue allows a 
constitutional order to be responsive to the needs of different societal forces within society. 
This republican understanding links civic republicanism and institutional balance. Both 
demand that a plurality of societal interests is involved in the distinct processes of 
governance within a constitutional order. In this way, different societal forces can exchange 
ideas and learn from one another, improving both the individual and the community. . From 
this point of view, public decisions reflect ongoing public dialogues with multiple societal 
forces that aim to reconcile competing perspectives concerning how to achieve the public 
good. 
Civic republicans understand that the public good is ultimately realized through an 
ongoing public dialogue that is reflected in public decisions. For these reasons, each societal 
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force has a shared responsibility toward the community; not only can citizens actively 
participate in the political life, but they have a constitutional duty to do so.77 
In any constitutional order, a certain degree of interference with individual and 
political self-determination is necessary to fulfil the ends of society. 78  Competing 
perspectives exist over what the public good is, or should be, and how best to achieve it. Such 
competing perspectives must be balanced in dialogical fora for contestation and 
reconciliation. Therefore, each societal force has the potential to contribute to various 
processes of governance, with the aim of achieving the public good.79 
This section has illustrated that active civic participation is essential to the realization 
of individual and political self-determination. It shows that the republican model aims to 
balance the exercise of public power with individual and political self-determination, thus 
ensuring non-domination and non-arbitrariness in the EU.80 A chief objective of the model is 
to ensure that any intervention with individual and political self-determination is legitimate 
insofar as it is consistent with republican values. The following section elucidates how the 
ideals of civic republican reflect the essential elements of this republican model. 
2. A dialogical paradigm for a republican constitutional order  
To secure central tenets of republicanism, the republican model of institutional balance as 
constitutional dialogue demands public power to be constitutionally constrained, and diffused 
across different societal forces.81 This model requires a constitutional and institutional 
apparatus that ensures non-dominant and non-arbitrary exercise of public power. This is 
designed to prevent the monopolization of public power within any single actor. Accordingly, 
republicanism compels a multitude of constitutional constraints so that each societal force 
exercises public power in a non-dominating fashion.  
Dominance, from Pettit’s perspective, exists in a relationship where an agent (X) 
enjoys a degree of external control over another societal force (Y), allowing X to arbitrarily 
interfere with the individual and political self-determination of Y.82 Each societal force must 
be ‘free and equal’ to articulate and pursue their own view of the public good.83 To prevent 
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such domination public power must be balanced by means of constitutional controls to secure 
non-domination. This demands a constitutional order that incorporates distinct process norms, 
which promote public deliberation and prevent the arbitrary interference of individual and 
political self-determination. 
A legitimate constitutional order ensures republican values are linked with the ‘good 
life’, including values that promote human rights, constitutional norms, balanced government 
and the rule of law.84 To guarantee non-domination and non-arbitrariness, representatives of 
pluralistic societal interests must have their voices heard in the political process. Ideally, 
public deliberation through dialogical processes helps to reconcile competing perspectives of 
what the public good is and how best to achieve it. Importantly, each societal force must have 
a diverse range of process norms to engage in an ongoing public dialogue concerning how 
best to resolve constitutional conflicts.85 Such an inclusive form of governance includes an 
array of distinct societal forces in each exercise of power, which provides for distinct veto 
players and multi-actor processes of governance. Such multi-actor processes of governance 
aim to allow each societal force to engage in the art of governance while preventing any 
single force from unilaterally dominating it.  
This republican model understands that the nature of a constitutional order is not 
immutable. 86  Constitutional arrangements, structures and processes will never be 
permanently fixed. Instead, to promote self-governance, a constitutional order must be 
dynamic and responsive to an ongoing public dialogue concerning how best to govern.87 
Republicanism has long emphasized dialogical processes of governance that reflect pluralistic 
interests, reconciling and balancing competing societal forces within a constitutional order.88 
Thus, republican ideals can facilitate dynamism and responsiveness. Similarly, this model 
applies a dialogical model of republicanism to the EU’s constitutional order. 
This model promotes ex-ante and ex-post processes of both a legal and political nature 
in different dialogical fora of contestation, compromise, and reconciliation.89 It provides the 
framework to ensure each societal force can actively participate in political life. The 
dialogical fora allow for processes of mutual learning and an exchange of ideas among 
different societal forces to achieve the good life. The shared creation of constitutional norms 
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seeking to achieve the public good allows for an ongoing reassessment and re-articulation of 
the public good.90  
 From this republican viewpoint, dialogical fora that promote competition and 
reconciliation are necessary to secure a non-arbitrary and constitutionally constrained 
framework. This constitutional model demands dialogical fora capable of counterbalancing 
different actors. Accordingly, EU governance consists of ongoing, multi-actor, and 
interactive processes, where different societal forces engage in negotiation, contestation, and 
comprise. Such processes ultimately aim to reconcile competing visions of the institutional 
balance and how best to govern to achieve the public good in the EU. The creation, 
enforcement, and interpretation of shared constitutional norms through such dialogical 
processes, is an essential feature of civic republicanism. 91  The shared creation of 
constitutional norms allows for the ongoing reinterpretation and reassessment of the 
institutional balance and how best to realize republican ideals linked to the public good. This 
understanding reflects the intricacies of contemporary governance and the evolution of the 
institutional balance in the EU constitutional order. 
Constitutional dialogue demands that no societal force is absolute.92 No actor can 
unilaterally establish what the public good is or how best to achieve it. From this view, 
neither the legislator nor the judiciary is absolute. Further, this model understands that the 
will of the people, as vital as it is in a democratic society, is also not absolute. Majoritarian 
rule alone is not synonymous with a democratic constitutional order. The majority – like any 
other societal force – can behave tyrannically in pursuit of self-interests if left unchecked. 
Thus, the majoritarian rule can lead to the democratic oppression of non-majoritarian societal 
forces where winning election leads to a dominant position over those who lost. For these 
reasons, majoritarian forces must be checked and controlled. Demanding the participation of 
a plurality of societal forces in each exercise of public power – creating, applying, and 
interpreting – allows for each societal force to be counterbalanced.  
Representative government in this republican model demands public decisions reflect 
the will of the people. However, non-majoritarian tools, such as judicial review and 
technocratic governance, also have a role to play counterbalancing majoritarian forces.93 
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Under this model, the rule of law is fundamental since it prevents any societal force from 
exercising power in an arbitrary, oppressive, or tyrannical manner.  
This section has elucidated central themes in the republican model of institutional 
balance as constitutional dialogue. A constitutional order must promote dialogical fora 
consisting of ex-ante and ex-post legal and political controls, to achieve these republican 
ideals and ensure each societal force can contribute to political life.  The discourse 
concerning EU governance predominately concentrates on the intergovernmental and 
supranational paradigm. However, such debates do not paint a complete portrait of the 
intricate workings of EU governance. In the subsequent section, this republican model is 
applied to the EU and incorporates broader dimensions of EU governance beyond this 
traditional paradigm. 
 
E. THE DIFFERENT DIMENSIONS OF EU GOVERNANCE: PURSUING A 
NON-DOMINATING PARADIGM 
The debates between intergovernmental and supranational governance continue to be a focal 
point in the discourse concerning European integration and constitutionalization.94 It is 
necessary to go beyond this traditional vision to reflect the realities of EU governance. 
Accordingly, this analysis puts forth an alternative to this intergovernmental versus 
supranational paradigm. In addition to the main constituencies of the EU – the peoples, the 
Member States, and the Union – this study includes the interest group and the technocratic 
dimension.95 From this viewpoint, the central themes throughout the evolution of the EU 
constitutional order produce societal forces representing different dimensions of EU 
governance: intergovernmental, supranational, the peoples of Europe, interest groups, and 
technocratic. This analysis incorporates a broad array of societal forces representing 
competing interests that shape and reshape the institutional balance. It is important to note 
that each of the different dimensions operates in unique societal and political context. Each of 
the dimensions has multiple actors, with their own formal and informal processes designed to 
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shape the institutional balance in a manner that conforms to its own version of the public 
good. 
The multi-actor and interactive processes of EU governance are developed to ensure 
non-domination in each of the processes of governance and the overall EU constitutional 
order. Multiple societal forces in each dimension are designed to exercise power in a manner 
that counterbalances each, preventing any actor dominating the distinct processes of EU 
governance. The following sections explore the different dimensions of EU governance and 
provide guidance for establishing and maintaining dialogical fora of contestation and 
reconciliation that achieve non-dominating ideals. 
1. The intergovernmental dimension 
The intergovernmental dimension understands the EU is a ‘traditional’ international 
organization, focusing on the role of Member States in European integration. This dimension 
initially concentrated on the role of the Council in EU governance. The Council and its 
working group COREPER remain significant players in the EU, as it continues to play a key 
role in the processes of EU governance including exercising lawmaking, budgetary, and 
control functions. With the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty, however, the Council 
increasingly shares lawmaking authority with the EP. In the aftermath of the introduction of 
the ordinary legislative procedure, in the Lisbon Treaty, the two organs operate as co-equal 
legislatures in most policy areas.96   
A significant development in the intergovernmental dimension is the enhanced role of 
the European Council in EU governance. The European Council’s scope, power, and role in 
EU decision-making have steadily increased.97  The European Council has transformed from 
an informal body with relatively little ‘real’ coercive power power to a formal  in the early 
part of the 1970s, to a formal Union institution that considerably shapes the overall direction 
of the contemporary EU governance. The European Council consists of the heads of States or 
Government of its Member States, the Presidents of the Commission and the President of the 
European Council, and the High Representative is meant to provide strategic guidance for the 
EU.98  
 The evolution of the European Council’s role in the EU constitutional order is vital 
from the republican perspective. First, its increasing powers, including becoming a formal 
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institution in the Lisbon Treaty, under Article 13 TEU indicates that the Council is no longer 
the only important intergovernmental actor in EU governance. The increased role of the 
European Council prevents the Council from dominating the intergovernmental dimension. 
Second, the increase in the European Council’s powers can mitigate gains made by 
supranational actors, such as the EP or the European Central Bank (ECB). This mitigates the 
potential risk of the supranational dimension dominating EU governance.  
2. The supranational dimension 
The supranational dimension has concentrated on three Union institutions: the EP, the 
Commission, and the CJEU.99 Increasingly, studies focusing on EU governance also explore 
the role of the ECB ECB, especially in the aftermath of the euro-crisis.100 Over time, these 
supranational actors tend to acquire greater powers, potentially counterbalancing the rise of 
the European Council.  
 One of the most transformative developments in this supranational dimension has 
been the increasing strength of the EP through European integration.101 The augmented 
institutional position of the EP is evident when comparing the EP’s increasing formal and 
informal powers to those of the Council and Commission, whose powers have largely 
remained unchanged.102 Similar to the European Council, the EP has transformed from an 
advisory body, with little coercive power into an extremely valuable player in EU 
governance.   
The EP now exercises significant legislative, budgetary, and control authority.103 This 
development is particularly striking in the lawmaking and budgetary spheres, where the EP 
has utilized an array of different sources – CJEU litigation, inter-institutional agreements, and 
budgetary tactics – to enhance its institutional position and protect its prerogatives.104 The 
EP’s enhanced strength is also evident in its supervisory powers of the Commission and 
ECB, where its committees can act as a key dialogical forum for oversight, control, and 
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accountability.105 Importantly, such changes have occurred both through formal means via 
successive Treaty changes and informal processes, such as inter-institutional agreements and 
budgetary negotiations. However, as the EP strength increases in successive Treaty reforms, 
voter turnout has consistently dropped from 63 percent to 43 percent over a thirty-year period 
from 1979 to 2009.106 This leads to questions concerning whether the enhanced powers of the 
EP have a meaningful impact on reducing the perception of the democratic deficit. Unlike the 
EP, the Commission’s powers have remained relatively the same. 
 The Commission remains a significant player in the EU lawmaking process, through 
its right of initiative for legislative acts.107 Moreover, the Commission is often considered the 
‘guardian of the Treaties’ and continues to exercise important executive and regulatory 
powers. A chief aim of the Commission is to act as a unitary executive and exercise its 
regulatory powers with little to no oversight from the Council or the EP. The Commission has 
yet to realize this objective, as the Council and EP have opted to establish comitology 
committees and European agencies to disperse executive and regulatory power within the 
EU. Furthermore, the co-legislators are ideally able to exercise significant control 
mechanisms when delegating lawmaking authority to the Commission.108 
One of the most significant events regarding the power dynamics concerning the 
Commission and the EP was the downfall of the Santer Commission in 1999. The forced 
resignation of the Santer Commission prompted by the EP illustrated that significant reforms 
were needed to enhance the Commission’s public reputation. The Santer Commission’s 
downfall exemplifies the EP’s control powers over the Commission. A noteworthy 
development in this regard is the Commission’s White Paper on Good Governance, which 
was published in reaction to the removal of the Santer Commission.109 
The CJEU is a vital player in the European integration and ‘constitutionalization’ 
process.110 The Court has made a profound impact shaping how public power is balanced in 
the EU by utilizing its role under Article 19 TEU to ensure the rule of law concerning the 
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interpretation and application of the Treaties is observed.111 In this context, the CJEU has 
been a vigorous actor in establishing the mutually interdependent and shared creation of 
constitutional norms. The CJEU has utilized various processes to constitutionalize the EU 
Treaties, notably the teleological interpretation of the Treaty, the doctrines of direct effect 
supremacy, and institutional balance. 112 
In two pivotal decisions, Van Gend en Loos and Costa, the CJEU ‘created a new legal 
order’ and established constitutional norms in direct effect and supremacy that fundamentally 
transformed the EU constitutional order.113 In addition, the Court has continuously stressed 
the constitutional nature of the EU in cases like Les Verts.114 The Court has also played an 
essential role in constitutional conflicts concerning the institutional balance. For instance, 
establishing the institutional balance in the concept of Meroni, and continuously interpreting 
and reinterpreting the institutional balance in cases such as Comitology, Chernobyl and 
ESMA, the CJEU has been instrumental in shaping the interactions between Union actors.115   
Importantly, the competing societal – legal, political, economic, and cultural – forces 
across Europe and the different Member States provide the Court with the ability to act as 
problem-solver, potentially reconciling competing legitimacy claims, constitutional values, 
and societal interests.116 In this way, the Court engages with judicial and extrajudicial societal 
elements to provide its own view on how best to resolve constitutional conflicts. This allows 
the Court to act as a judicial forum that provides a fair and equitable process. For these 
reasons, the CJEU exercises judicial review and utilizes teleological interpretation to achieve 
the objectives of the Treaty based on its own vision of the public good within the Union.  
The analysis shows that the significant role played by the EP, the Commission and the 
CJEU in the supranational dimension diminishes the potential for any of these actors to 
obtain a dominant position in this dimension or EU governance generally. Further, the 
increasing powers exercised by the EP, CJEU and ECB can counterbalance the rise of the 
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European Council in the intergovernmental dimension or actors in other dimensions that have 
evolved throughout European integration. 
3. The peoples of Europe dimension 
The Lisbon Treaty declares that the EU is founded on democracy, among other values.117 The 
EU has consistently sought to increase the number of ways to promote inclusive governance. 
This demand for more inclusive governance has the potential to provide an enhanced role for 
European citizens.118 
National parliaments now have the formal powers to influence EU lawmaking.119 
Traditionally, however, national parliaments were an afterthought in the European integration 
process. The Lisbon Treaty introduces a formal role for national parliaments in EU decision-
making. 120  During the ordinary legislative procedure, national parliaments provide 
subsidiarity checks under Article 5 TEU and Protocol 2 on the application of subsidiarity and 
proportionality. National parliaments can also monitor the functioning of the Union under 
Article 12 TEU. The Lisbon Treaty requires that national parliaments have access to 
information to allow them to perform these constitutional tasks.121 
The peoples of Europe are also important players in the European integration process. 
National referenda concerning core issues of European integration have shaped the 
institutional balance and increasingly highlight the need for Europe to be responsive to the 
demands of the people,122 such as the close referenda concerning the ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992.123 In France, 51% of people voted in favour of ratification, while 
in Denmark nearly 51% of the people voted against ratification on the first vote, but 56 % 
voted in favour on the second vote.  The ratification of the Nice Treaty124 in 2001 was also 
vigorously contested. In Ireland, nearly 54% of the people voted against the Nice Treaty in 
the first round. In the second round, however, nearly 63% of people voted in favour.  The 
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2005 referenda for the European Constitution caused even greater contestation with 55% of 
the French population and 62% of the Dutch population voting against the Treaty. 
 The vote on the EU Referendum in the United Kingdom (ie Brexit) transformed the 
EU constitutional landscape. The groundbreaking ‘non-binding’ referendum asked whether 
the United Kingdom should leave or remain in the EU.125 Almost 52% of the electorate voted 
to leave the Union. The question of how the departure of a Member State impacts the 
constitutional structure and decision-making arrangements in the EU and shapes the 
institutional balance of the EU, is now an increasingly pressing one. In particular, the Brexit 
vote has led to ongoing public dialogues between an array of actors operating at different 
levels of governance, concerning how to reconcile competing visions of the future of the 
EU.126  
One of the innovative developments of the Lisbon Treaty is the European Citizens 
Initiative (ECI). Under Article 11.4 TEU, when at least a million citizens from different 
Member States agree, a new initiative is proposed to the Commission requesting it to use its 
right of initiative to start new Union action. Despite the potential to use the ECI to ensure EU 
governance is responsive to the will of the people, the ECI has rarely been used since its 
inception in the Lisbon Treaty. However, if the ECI is promoted and applied correctly it can 
reflect the republican model of institutional balance as constitutional dialogue. The ECI, 
along with other developments in this people of Europe dimension, could facilitate active 
participation of a diverse array of citizens within the EU, operating as a dialogical forum that 
diminishes any perceived democratic deficit and enhances the legitimation of the EU 
constitutional order. This can in turn alleviate concerns that technocrats are controlling EU 
governance at the expense of the peoples of Europe. 
4. The interests group dimension 
Public and private interest groups now play a crucial role in EU governance.127 Through 
social dialogue, the role of social partners – representatives of management and labor – can 
contribute to shaping EU social policy exemplifying the role such actors can play in the EU.  
The role of the social partners in social policy is enshrined in the Treaty.128 Furthermore, 
Article 154 TFEU provides that the Commission must consult the social partners before 
acting in the field of social policy.  
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The Commission is tasked with promoting the consultation of the social partners at 
the Union level and fostering dialogue with them to ensure balanced support from both the 
management and labor representatives.129 This inclusion engenders a Union-wide debate that 
includes divergent actors within European civil society. The process allows the social 
partners to negotiate among themselves and request the Commission to propose their 
initiative to the Council. Alternatively, social partners may come to their own agreements and 
utilize their own specific procedures. 
Additionally, both management and labor representatives can provide the 
Commission with an opinion or, where appropriate, a recommendation concerning the type of 
action necessary for the field of social policy.130 The Social Dialogue Committee is also a key 
forum at the EU level for the bipartite social dialogue between management and labor. This 
dialogical framework established for management and labor representatives is designed to 
prevent either from dominating how civil society shapes EU governance. This also allows 
interests groups to respond to decisions made by the central organs of EU governance in the 
intergovernmental or supranational dimensions, the peoples of Europe dimension, or by 
decentralized actors in the technocratic dimension. 
5. The technocratic dimension 
The subject of delegating powers and secondary rulemaking power is deeply contested.131 At 
its core, it presents certain fundamental constitutional questions that have the potential to 
shape and ultimately distort the balance within a constitutional order. 132  Among the 
fundamental constitutional issues brought to the fore are the legitimation, efficacy, 
democratic nature, and accountability of secondary rulemaking in the EU.133 Such questions 
include: how and why does the delegation of power occur? Which actors participate in non-
legislative secondary rulemaking and how? What criteria govern the delegation? How are 
actors that exercise delegated powers held to account? What control mechanisms are 
available and which actors can exercise them and when? Consequently, constitutional debates 
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over secondary rulemaking in the EU exemplify profound inter-institutional contestation over 
the institutional balance.134   
Thus, a fundamental question in the field of delegation is what amount of autonomy 
and discretion the Commission has when one of or both Union legislators, ie the Council and 
the EP, delegate power to the Commission. Furthermore, what methods of control do the 
Council or the EP have when they delegate powers to the Commission? As a result, much of 
the debate in delegated decision-making concentrates on how much autonomy the 
Commission should have in the field and who should control the Commission to ensure its 
actions are consistent with rules governing the exercise of implementing powers.  
The comitology system has proven to be an instrumental aspect of non-legislative 
secondary lawmaking throughout the history of European integration. 135  Although 
comitology started in the 1960s as a committee system that established rules of a technical 
nature in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the adoption of secondary legislation has 
gained increasing importance in the EU. The role of comitology committees in the making of 
secondary legislation has now spread across almost every area of EU law and policy.  
Importantly, non-legislative secondary rulemaking incorporates both technical decisions and 
substantive decisions of a politically sensitive nature.136 The complexity of the comitology 
system, which includes distinct committee procedures, multiple participants exercising 
constitutional authority in various matters, and different control mechanisms, led to deep 
contestation and increasing calls for changes in the system. Over the years, many 
modifications to the comitology system occurred. The Lisbon Treaty is another important 
step in the constantly evolving delegated decision-making framework in the EU.   
The Lisbon Treaty brought innovative changes to delegated decision-making from a 
formal and practical aspect. These modifications include the introduction of Articles 290 and 
291 TFEU, and the post-Lisbon Comitology Regulation, as new measures intended to 
operationalize the Lisbon Treaty and ensure its objectives are met.137 The post-Lisbon non-
legislative secondary rule-making framework is designed to clarify and augment the 
legitimation of the making of secondary norms by distinguishing between delegated and 
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implementing acts.138  Such changes have modified the role actors play in the delegation, the 
various functions those actors exercise, and introduced new terminology and operations for 
the procedures and variants used in delegated decision-making, while also creating new legal 
bases for the delegation of powers to the Commission by the Council and EP. Consequently, 
intense inter-institutional battles concerning institutional balance in delegated decision-
making remain in the wake of the Lisbon Treaty. 
The creation of EU agencies has fundamentally altered the EU constitutional order.  
The question of the precise nature and scope of EU agencies has caused major inter-
institutional debates between the EP, the Council, and the Commission.139 This question is 
difficult to answer because different actors have various perspectives on the nature, powers, 
resources, and function of EU agencies.140 Agencies are a result of different political 
compromises between the EP, Council, and Commission.141 
 The different dimensions of EU governance show the fundamental importance of the 
non-dominating paradigm within the EU constitutional order. The pluralistic, multi-actor and 
interactive processes in each of these dimensions highlight the dynamic nature of EU 
governance. The analysis shows that the constitutional and institutional apparatus within the 
EU with the increasing rise and proliferation of a plurality of societal force is designed not 
only to prevent dominance within any dimension but across dimensions, and prevents any 
actor from dominating the distinct processes of EU governance. 
This section highlights that actors in each of these five dimensions are vital players 
‘free and equal’ to exert influence that shapes and reshapes the institutional balance in a 
manner that reflects their own vision of the public good. Each is subject to ex-ante and ex-
post controls that prevent it from dominating its dimension and EU governance generally. For 
these reasons, this republican model of institutional balance as constitutional dialogue 
provides the frame for the active participation and limitation of actors and can be understood 
as enhancing and legitimating the democratic nature of the EU. 
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F. CONCLUSION 
This article assesses how a republican model of institutional balance as constitutional 
dialogue can be used to better understand the EU. This contribution further shows that non-
domination is a foundational organizing principle at the heart of European integration. The 
framers of the European ‘project’ set out to create a non-dominating paradigm that prevents 
any single societal force from unilaterally imposing its own version of the public good. This 
non-dominating vision remains a paramount objective in contemporary EU governance.  
However, the challenges identified in this article have increasingly led to questions as 
to how to restructure and enhance the legitimation of the EU constitutional order. Despite the 
enduring ideal of non-domination that seeks to achieve a balance between competing societal 
forces, republicanism remains an underutilized model for enhancing the legitimation of the 
EU. The ongoing quest to legitimate the exercise of public power in contemporary EU 
governance and ensure a non-dominating and non-arbitrary constitutional order leads to the 
central question of this article: whether increased emphasis on a republican model of 
institutional balance as constitutional dialogue can contribute to our understanding of the 
evolution of the institutional balance in the EU constitutional order. In dealing with this 
question, it reassesses the EU constitutional order from a republican perspective, shedding 
light on the benefits of republicanism for EU constitutionalism. 
This study contends that a republican model of institutional balance as constitutional 
dialogue can and should be used as a legitimating principle in the EU. The reinterpretation of 
the institutional balance, with civic republicanism and dialogue as central elements, adds 
value to ongoing debates concerning how to legitimate the EU. The article illustrates that 
institutional balance, as opposed to the separation of powers, is the constitutional model that 
best captures the complex realities of EU governance. Moreover, the pluralistic, multilevel 
and dialogical processes within EU decision-making are designed to achieve the enduring 
aim of securing a non-dominating and non-arbitrary constitutional order.  
This constitutional model understands that the arbitrary interference with individual 
and political self-determination is less likely to occur when a plurality of societal forces 
participates in each of the different exercises of public power. To achieve essential elements 
of republicanism – non-domination, non-arbitrariness, pluralism, and the pursuit of public 
good – the model demands the existence of constitutional structures and processes that 
guarantee each societal force is ‘free and equal’. Thus, each can pursue its own version of the 
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public good. Ultimately, this republican model is based on shared constitutional authority, 
mutually interdependent and interactive societal elements.  
Furthermore, this republican model ensures an institutional balance designed to 
reconcile a plurality of competing societal interests, legitimacy claims, and constitutional 
perspectives on the public good. For these reasons, normative aims linked with the republican 
vision are particularly appealing in the multilevel system of EU governance. Thus, the active 
participation of the citizenry in the ‘art of governance’ is a central element of the republican 
ideal. Dialogical fora must be utilized not only to diminish the potential for societal conflict 
over how best to govern to achieve the public good, but also as a deliberative venue for 
competition and reconciliation. 
This dynamic understanding of institutional balance envisions that the Union 
oscillates between competing poles, not only the peoples of Europe, the Member States, and 
the Union, but also technocratic and interests group dimensions. The role such dimensions 
play in the EU demands that a delicate balancing act occur, diminishing the potential for any 
single dimension from unilaterally dominating the distinct processes of EU governance. Such 
societal forces fundamentally shape the institutional balance and its role in the EU 
constitutional order. The republican model and the different dimensions show that EU 
governance is of a heterarchical rather than hierarchical nature.  
The republican model and understanding of different dimensions provide a new frame 
to understand the institutional balance and its role in the EU constitutional order. As the 
analysis demonstrates, republicanism has been an essential feature of EU governance but EU 
discourse has yet to explicitly recognize this feature and continues to overlook the potential 
of a republican framework. The argument here, however, is not that the EU has fully realized 
the republican values associated with the model, but that the EU is continuously moving 
toward such objectives. In conclusion, this article contends that greater emphasis should be 
placed on republicanism and its application in the EU to enhance its democratic legitimacy.  
